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Abstract
This paper develops a model of search on the labour market with
training. The model reveals how the tax system can restore the social
optimum if the Hosios condition is not satis¯ed in the private equilib-
rium. Furthermore, the e®ects are explored of a second-best reform
from average to marginal taxes when a given amount of public rev-
enue has to be raised. We ¯nd that (i) a marginal wage tax is less
distortionary to raise revenue than is an average tax per job, provided
that training is not distorted initially; (ii) this conclusion may reverse
in the presence of training distortions; (iii) marginal wage taxes are
less distortionary in economies characterized by commitment in wage
bargaining, such as the European labour market. Hence, tax reforms
that reduce the average tax per job and raise the marginal wage tax,
such as an EITC or a negative income tax, are more attractive in
Europe than in the US.
1 Introduction
Many European countries su®er from structural labour-market problems,
such as high unemployment and low participation. To tackle these prob-
lems, various tax proposals have been put forward, including cuts in payroll
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1taxes on employers, earned income tax credits and negative income taxes
(see Snower and De la Dehesa (1996), Haveman (1996), S¿rensen (1997),
Bovenberg et al. (1999)). These proposals aim to reduce unemployment and
stimulate participation, without seriously damaging the incomes of transfer
recipients or cutting government spending. However, these measures typi-
cally make the tax system more progressive. This is the case if the lower
average tax burden on work is ¯nanced by a higher marginal tax burden on
higher incomes. Or, as in the case of an EITC, if a tax reduction at low
incomes is phased out to reduce the budgetary costs of the tax reduction
and to get back to the original tax schedule at high incomes. Accordingly,
the government typically faces a trade-o® between the positive e®ects of the
lower average tax per job on participation and the potential adverse incentive
e®ects of higher marginal taxes.
This paper illustrates this trade-o® in a model of search on the labor mar-
ket with training. On the one hand, our model is a special case of the frame-
work developed by Pissarides (1990) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1999).
In particular, we use a static (or one shot) version of their models, where
agents incur search costs to ¯nd a vacancy and ¯rms post vacancies at a
¯xed cost. After being matched, a worker and a ¯rm Nash bargain about the
wage. It is well-known that in this type of models taxes in°uence the division
of the surplus between worker and ¯rm (see for instance Mortensen and Pis-
sarides (1998) and Pissarides (1999)). Hence, taxes in°uence search intensity,
the number of vacancies and unemployment. On the other hand, we extend
the Mortensen-Pissarides framework by introducing training decisions. As
stressed by the training literature, high marginal tax rates typically reduce
the inc1entive to acquire skills (see e.g. Trostel (1993), Dupor et al. (1996),
S¿rensen and Nielsen (1997), Bovenberg and van Ewijk (1997), Heckman
et al. (1999)). With our model, we aim to illustrate the trade-o® between
the possible bene¯cial e®ect of an EITC on unemployment and the possible
detrimental e®ect on training.
The advantage of focusing on a static version of a search and match-
ing model is that we are able to derive analytical solutions for the optimal
taxes. Pissarides (1999) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) evaluate the
e®ects of tax reform in dynamic search models numerically using simulation
techniques. In particular, Pissarides (1999) considers the e®ects of wage tax
reform on unemployment and wages in four di®erent models. In the case of
constant real unemployment bene¯ts, he ¯nds that a higher marginal tax rate
reduces unemployment. This is comparable to the results we ¯nd below by
2assuming that training costs are completely tax deductible. If training costs
are only partly tax deductible, however, increasing the marginal tax rate will
reduce labour market tightness and employment. Mortensen and Pissarides
(1998) consider a far broader array of taxes and subsidies, including hiring
subsidies and ¯ring taxes. However, they do not derive analytical results on
the optimal use of these instruments.
In our model, the tax system serves a threefold task. First, the tax sys-
tem should correct for distortions in training. Subsidies on training are able
to alleviate these distortions. Second, taxes need to restore ine±ciencies
in labour-market tightness. The latter distortion arises from the mismatch
between the marginal productivity of search (vacancies) in the matching pro-
cess, and the corresponding bargaining power of the worker (¯rm) in wage
negotiations, which determine the private marginal bene¯t from job match-
ing.1 We show that a combination of average taxes per job and marginal wage
taxes can always be used to restore the Hosios condition by redistributing
the surplus from a match between the worker and the ¯rm. Finally, the tax
system aims to raise public revenue with least cost to the private sector. We
¯nd that, if labour-market tightness and training are not distorted initially,
the marginal wage tax is always less distortionary than the average tax per
job as an instrument to raise public revenue. The reason is that, although
both taxes distort search through adversely a®ecting the expected surplus
for the worker, the average tax distorts labour-market tightness as well. We
relate this result to the Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) intuition of production
e±ciency. The result has important implications for the welfare e®ects of
an EITC. Indeed, if the government would adopt average taxes initially to
¯nance its spending (in addition to using them to correct for labour-market
tightness), a small reduction in the average tax per job ¯nanced by a higher
marginal wage tax { which can be interpreted as an EITC { is welfare im-
proving.
This result may change if training is taxed on a net basis, e.g. because the
government does not have access to training subsidies or because the costs
of training are not fully tax deductible. One might guess that adding train-
ing distortions to the model would always call for a lower marginal tax rate.
However, we ¯nd that the opposite may be true as well. In particular, initial
training distortions introduce two additional e®ects of tax reforms on wel-
1Equality between the marginal productivity and marignal private bene¯ts is known
as the Hosios condition.
3fare. On the one hand, higher marginal taxes exacerbate the initial training
distortion by further reducing training e®ort. On the other hand, a higher
marginal tax reduces the surplus for the ¯rm because the net tax burden on
training reduces the value of a match. This distorts the ratio of vacancies
to search if labour-market tightness is sub-optimal initially. Whereas the
¯rst e®ect raises the distortionary impact of marginal wage taxes, the second
e®ect can work in both directions, depending on whether labor-market tight-
ness is too high or too low. Accordingly, training distortions can make the
introduction of an EITC either more or less attractive. This result originates
in the second-best character of the model. In particular, marginal taxes not
only exacerbate initial training distortions, but may also alleviate distortions
associated with labour-market tightness.
The paper explores two alternative assumptions regarding training. First,
bargaining parties may commit to the wage pro¯le before training takes place.
In that case, workers and ¯rms share the costs and bene¯ts of training. In
a second model, wage bargaining occurs after the training. In this latter
framework, workers bear the entire cost of training, while the bene¯ts are
shared across the worker and the ¯rm.2 It turns out that the wage pro¯le is
°atter in the no-commitment case than in the commitment case. This causes
two additional distortions in the no-commitment case. First, training is too
low since the social bene¯ts of training exceed the private bene¯ts for the
worker. This distortion can be alleviated by setting training subsidies above
the marginal wage tax. Second, since training costs do not reduce the surplus
from a match to the ¯rm, they distort labour-market tightness. This calls for
a higher average tax and a lower marginal tax, compared to the commitment
case.
Our comparison of the commitment and no commitment cases is related
to the analysis of Acemoglu and Shimer (1999). They present a model in
which ¯rms can increase the value of a match by investing in capital before
being matched with a worker. They show that with (Nash) bargaining over
wages after the match, the private outcome is never e±cient. In particu-
lar, if bargaining gives ¯rms the right incentives to post vacancies, there is
underinvestment in capital. Also, if ¯rms' incentives lead to e±cient capital
stocks, there is overinvestment in vacancies. Acemoglu and Shimer show that
2The ine±ciency associated with the gap between the marginal private cost and bene¯ts
of training would disappear if the cost of training are shared across the worker and the
¯rm in the same way as the bene¯ts are distributed.
4if ¯rms can commit to a wage before being matched and post that wage to
workers searching for a job, then the private outcome can be e±cient. In our
model, it is the worker who can increase the value of the match by investing
in training. Although the training decision is taken after the worker and
¯rm are matched, it is taken before wages are (re)negotiated. If the ¯rm and
worker can commit to a (Nash bargained) wage schedule before the training
decision is taken, the worker chooses the e±cient training e®ort. However, if
the parties cannot commit and (re)negotiate after the training decision, it is
not possible that both the training and ¯rms' vacancy decisions are e±cient.
This is similar to the Acemoglu and Shimer result. Whereas they consider
di®erent ways of market organization to solve the problem, we focus on the
use of tax instruments to restore e±ciency.
The model with commitment may be more relevant for European labour
markets while the labour market in the US may be characterized by less com-
mitment. Indeed, a higher degree of corporatism in European labour markets
precludes that individuals renege on ex-ante agreed wage outcomes. This
commitment in EU labour markets encourages investment in ¯rm-speci¯c
training (Teulings and Hartog, 1998). Our analysis reveals that tax reforms
which reduce the average tax per job and raise the marginal wage tax { such
as an EITC or a negative income tax { tend to be more attractive in Europe
than in the US.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section elaborates
on the search model with training. In that model, bargaining parties com-
mit to the wage pro¯le before the training decision is made. Section 2 also
illustrates how taxes in the private outcome may restore the social optimum
and explores a reform from average to marginal taxes if the government has
a positive revenue requirement. Section 3 presents how the model changes if
there is no commitment with respect to the wage pro¯le and reveals how the
tax system can restore the social optimum in this case. Section 4 concludes.
The appendix contains the proofs of all results in the paper.
2 Model with commitment
This section develops a model of search on the labour market. The model de-
scribes the matching process between vacancies posted by ¯rms, and workers
that search for a job. A job match yields a surplus that is divided across the
worker and the ¯rm through a bargaining process. Workers can also engage
5in training in order to raise their skill level and thus to receive a higher wage.
Firms may in°uence the training decision by changing the wage pro¯le.
In contrast to most search models, our framework is of a one-shot nature.
This is a considerable simpli¯cation of the dynamic models in Mortensen and
Pissarides (1999). However, the static model captures a number of features
of the dynamic models. Most notably, it captures the Hosios condition dis-
cussed below. The simpli¯cation allows us to introduce a training decision
in the model and still derive analytical solutions for the optimal tax rates.
This focuses the analysis on the three distortions in the model: the hold
up problem in search and vacancy creation, the distortion in training and
the positive revenue requirement of the government. Moreover, the results
can be interpreted in the light of the Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) produc-
tion e±ciency result, which appears to be new in the search and matching
literature.
In the model, sequencing in the decision process is important. In partic-
ular, the commitment model has the following timing structure.
time t
agents ¯rms
0 search intensity si vacancies v
1 matches m(v;s)
2 bargaining Ve
3 wage pro¯le (w0;w1)
4 training e®ort ¾
5 output (y0;y1)
At t = 0, ¯rms decide whether or not to open up a vacancy at a ¯xed
cost k: At the same time, workers choose their search intensity si at cost
°(si), where °(0) = 0;°0(0) = 0;°00(si) > 0 and lim
si!1°0(si) = +1. The set of
workers is modelled as the unit interval, hence i 2 [0;1].
At t = 1, ¯rms and workers are matched, where the total number of
matches equals m(v;s) with s =
R 1
0 sidi. The matchingsfunction is homoge-
nous of degree one in v and s and is increasing and concave in each (separate)
argument. We denote the matching elasticity of search by ´ and the elasticity
of vacancies by 1¡´. As argued by, among others, Blanchard and Diamond
(1989) and Broersma and Van Ours (1999), a Cobb-Douglas matchingsfunc-
6tion m(v;s) = m0v1¡´s´ is a reasonable approximation in reality. We assume
that the matchingsfunction is of this form and hence ´ is a constant. Firms
and workers that are not matched have value 0.
At t = 2, ¯rms and workers bargain about the value of being employed
for a worker Ve.
At t = 3, the ¯rm determines the wage pro¯le (w0;w1) where w0 is the
net (of taxes) wage for an untrained worker and w1 the net wage of a trained
worker. The pro¯le has to satisfy the property that the expected value of
being employed equals (at least) the bargained value Ve.
At t = 4, the worker chooses his training e®ort ¾ at a cost c¾: A train-
ing e®ort ¾ brings the worker in the trained state with probability p(¾) and
leaves the worker in the untrained state with probability 1 ¡ p(¾), where
p0(¾) > 0 and p00(¾) < 0. This training technology assumption simpli¯es the
analysis in two dimensions. First, it captures a dynamic decision in a static
framework. The literature on training generally models the incentive to train
as the gain in future wage income compared to the current disutility of train-
ing, often modelled as the income forgone due to the time spend on training
(see e.g. Heckman et al. (1999) and the references therein). Our formaliza-
tion captures these incentives, although in a somewhat di®erent manner. In
particular, our static framework does not include the time lag between the
moment of training and the appearance of the bene¯ts in the form of higher
wages.3 Furthermore, the disutility of training is captured by e®ort costs,
rather than time. The crucial element in the training literature, however,
is not whether training cost refer to time, but rather the degree of tax de-
ductibility of training costs (Trostel, 1993). We capture tax deductibility in
our analysis by means of a training subsidy.4 Second, our training technology
has only two states, trained and untrained, while the training decision ¾ is
a continuous variable. Alternatively, one could have modelled training as a
deterministic process where a worker's productivity is a continuous function
of training e®ort ¾. Since workers are ex ante identical and risk neutral this is
equivalent to the model above.5 However, in this case one would have had to
model how the wage depends on productivity for an interval of productivities
3The model is thus a special case of the dynamic framework by assuming a zero discount
rate.
4We turn to the possible limitations of our approach in the concluding remarks.
5This can be seen as follows. Let y(¾) denote a worker's productivity as a function
of his training e®ort ¾. Further, let y1 (y0) denote a worker's productivity in trained
(untrained) state. Then de¯ning y(¾) ´ p(¾)y1 +(1 ¡ p(¾))y0 shows the equivalence.
7instead of just two levels of productivity.
At t = 5, output is produced and wages are paid, where a trained worker
produces y1 and receives net wage w1 and an untrained worker produces y0
(with y1 > y0) and receives w0.
This sequencing in the decision making process implies that bargain-
ing parties commit to the wage pro¯le before the training decision is made.
Hence, the model does not give rise to the hold-up problem in training invest-
ments. Section 4 will elaborate on the alternative case in which bargaining
parties can renegotiate the wage, after the training decision is made. How-
ever, the model in this section contains another hold-up problem, because
¯rms and agents cannot commit to the return to search or vacancies. Hence
each of the parties invests to create a joint surplus, while the division of the
surplus is bargained over after these investments are sunk. Correcting this
hold up problem turns out to be an important function of the tax system.
2.1 The private outcome
The process of job matching
The probability for a worker with search intensity si of being matched







where the ¯rst equality follows from the assumption that m(s;v) is homoge-
nous of degree 1 in v and s, µ ´
v
s denotes the labour market tightness and





where the value of not being matched is assumed to be equal to 0. Looking
at a symmetric equilibrium where each agent chooses the same si = s we ¯nd
that s solves
°
0(s) = m(µ)Ve (1)
Hence, marginal search costs equal the expected marginal gain from
search. Since we assume a strictly convex cost function for search (i.e.
8°00(s) > 0), the net expected surplus for the worker, sm(µ)Ve ¡ °(s) =
s°0(s) ¡°(s), is positive.





Assuming free entry into the vacancy posting business, the value for a ¯rm
of employing a worker Je satis¯es
m(µ)
µ
Je ¡ k = 0 (2)
where we use the assumption that the value of not being matched equals 0.
Hence, ¯rms earn zero pro¯ts in equilibrium.6
The value of a job match
Given a certain training e®ort ¾ and wage pro¯le (w0;w1), to be de-
termined below, the value of being employed for a worker depends on the
expected wage minus training costs





1+s¾ stands for a subsidy on training. The value of employing a worker
for a ¯rm equals
Je = p(¾)(y1 ¡ (1 + ¿)w1) + (1 ¡ p(¾))(y0 ¡ (1 + ¿)w0) ¡ ¿a
= p(¾)y1 + (1 ¡p(¾))y0 ¡ ¿a ¡ (1 + ¿)Ve ¡ (1 + Ã)c¾ (4)
where (1 + ¿)w + ¿a equals the total wage cost for the ¯rm of paying a net
wage w to the worker Hence, ¿ denotes the marginal tax rate on wages while
¿a stands for the tax per job. We refer to this as the average tax.7
Furthermore, 1 + Ã ´
1+¿
1+s¾ so that Ã measures the net tax burden on
training (see below).
The worker and the ¯rm bargain about Ve. This is modelled with a Nash
bargaining function with the threat points for both worker and ¯rm equal to
6If the cost of opening a vacancy would be a function of v (i.e. k(v), where k(:) is a
strictly convex function), there would be a positive surplus for the ¯rm. The e®ect on
optimal wage taxes of such a generalization is analyzed by Boone and Bovenberg (1999).
7This is in line with the Mortenson and Pissarides (1999) and others. In public ¯nance,
the average tax generally refers to the tax burden on wages. In our model, it might be
viewed as a tax on value-added, which is equivalent to the total surplus from a match.





e (p(¾)y1 + (1 ¡p(¾))y0 ¡ ¿a ¡ (1 + ¿)Ve ¡ (1 + Ã)c¾)
1¡¯




(¹ y ¡ (1 + Ã)c¾ ¡ ¿a) (5)
Je = (1 ¡ ¯)(¹ y ¡ (1 + Ã)c¾ ¡ ¿a) (6)
where ¹ y ´ p(¾)y1+(1¡p(¾))y0 denotes the expected output of a worker.
The bargaining outcome reveals that the total surplus from a match, ¹ y¡(1+
Ã)c¾ ¡¿a, is divided between the employee and the employer on the basis of
their respective bargaining powers,
¯
1+¿ and 1¡¯, respectively. The marginal
wage tax, ¿, reduces the value of a job for the worker. This is a well known
result, see for instance Pissarides (1999: 142, 143). The reason is that a high
marginal tax rate makes workers less aggressive in bargaining since a rise in
the gross wage translates in a small change in the net wage. Similarly, a high
¿ makes employers more aggressive in bargaining, since a rise in w translates
into a big rise in wage costs. In the Nash bargaining solution this e®ect of ¿
on the wage exactly cancels the higher ¿ for employers.
The surplus from a match, ¹ y¡(1+Ã)c¾¡¿a, is sum of three terms. First,
there is expected output ¹ y. Second, training costs are subtracted because
bargaining parties commit to the bargaining solution before the training de-
cision is made. Hence, the incidence of the training costs is divided between
the worker and the ¯rm. Apart from the gross cost of training, there is a net
tax burden on training, denoted by Ã. On the one hand, training costs are
subsidized through s¾. On the other hand, the compensation to employees
for the costs of training occurs through wage payments that are subject to
the marginal wage tax. If Ã > 0, the marginal wage tax exceeds the training
subsidy so that the compensation for training costs is taxed on a net basis.9
8This follows from the one shot nature of the game. If the ¯rm and worker cannot
agree on the value Ve, the match is dissolved. Then the worker and ¯rm receive the same
pay o® as the ¯rms and workers that were not matched at time 1. In equilibrium such
disagreement never happens.
9An alternative interpretation of the training subsidy is tax deductibility. In particular,
if s¾ = ¿, training costs would be fully tax deductible. This would be the case if training
costs consist of foregone working time (compare Boskin (1976)). If part of the training
costs is not tax deductible, e.g. because tuition is not tax deductible or if leisure is included
in the model, we ¯nd that s¾ < ¿ or equivalently Ã > 0 (see e.g. Trostel (1993)).
10This reduces the value of a match. Accordingly, the net tax burden on train-
ing is shared across the worker and the ¯rm. The ¯nal term is the average
tax, ¿a. By reducing the value of a match, this tax also bears on both the
employer and the employee.



















Given the (pre-commited) value Ve, the ¯rm will set the wage pro¯le






The way that the ¯rm implements this value for ¾ is to choose the di®erence
w1 ¡w0 such that the worker, choosing ¾ to maximize Ve, selects this value.
Hence, equation (9) determines w1 ¡w0 and (5) determines Ve. It is routine














((1 + Ã)c¾ + (1 ¡ p(¾))(y1 ¡ y0)) (11)
Using equation (9) to rewrite (1 + Ã)c¾ = p0(¾)¾(y1 ¡ y0) in equations (10)
and (11), one veri¯es that the concavity of p(:) implies that w0 is below
the renegotiation wage
¯
1+¿(y0 ¡ ¿a) and w1 above the renegotiation wage
¯
1+¿(y1 ¡ ¿a). This is discussed in section 4.
At the level of ¾, determined in (9), the free entry condition yields
kµ
m(µ)
= (1 ¡ ¯)(¹ y ¡ (1 + Ã)c¾ ¡¿a) (12)
11The three equations (8), (9) and (12) determine the three endogenous vari-
ables s, ¾ and µ. From these, we can derive the total number of matches
sm(µ) and total unemployment u = 1¡sm(µ). Total output equals sm(µ)(p(¾)y1+
(1 ¡ p(¾))y0):
2.2 The social optimum
As a measure of welfare, we use total expected output minus the total costs
of training, search and vacancies. Since workers and ¯rms are assumed to
be risk neutral, this is not an unreasonable criterion. Also note that the risk
neutrality assumption implies that there is no reason to redistribute income
among trained, untrained and unemployed workers. When below we consider
the case with positive government expenditure, g > 0, this welfare criterion
implies that government expenditure has the same social value as private
income and consumption.
sm(µ)[p(¾)y1 + (1 ¡ p(¾))y0 ¡ c¾] ¡ °(s) ¡ ksµ (13)
Assume that the social planner chooses s;µ and ¾ to maximize welfare (13).
Then the following result is a slight generalization of the Hosios (1990) condi-
tion to the case with training. For the case without training it is well known
(see for instance Pissarides (1990)) that ¯ = ´ and ¿ = ¿a = s¾ = 0 causes
the private outcome to coincide with the social optimum.
Lemma 1 If ¯ = ´ then
(i) ¿ = ¿a = s¾ = 0 implies that the private outcome coincides with the
social optimal outcome;
(ii) ¿ > 0;¿a ¸ 0 and Ã ¸ 0 implies that agents underinvest in search;
(iii) Ã > 0 (Ã < 0) implies that workers underinvest (overinvest) in train-
ing and if further ¿a ¸ 0 then ¯rms underinvest (overinvest) in vacancies;
(iv) ¿a > 0 (¿a < 0) and ¿ = s¾ = 0 implies that agents underinvest
(overinvest) in search and ¯rms underinvest (overinvest) in vacancies.
If ¿ = ¿a = s¾ = 0 then
(v) ¯ < ´ (¯ > ´) implies that tightness µ is too high (low) in the private
outcome;
(vi) ¯ 6= ´ implies that agents underinvest in search.
The intuition for these results is as follows.
12(i) If there are no distortionary taxes and the Hosios condition, ¯ =
´, is satis¯ed (see for instance Hosios (1990) or Mortensen and Pissarides
(1999)) then the private returns to training, search and creating vacancies
coincide with the social returns. The intuition for the Hosios condition is
that an agent's (¯rm's) bargaining power should coincide with the marginal
contribution of search (vacancies) in establishing a match. In particular, the
bargaining solution determines the marginal private bene¯ts of a match for
the ¯rm and the worker. If the marginal private bene¯ts equal the marginal
social bene¯ts, the hold up problem is solved as each party gets the social
return on its sunk investments in search, respectively, vacancies.
(ii) If there are positive wage tax distortions (¿ > 0), the private return
of search falls short of the social return. This follows from (8) because the
marginal tax ¿ does yield social surplus but is not captured by the worker.
(iii) If the training decision is not distorted (¿ = s¾ so that Ã = 0), the
marginal tax rate has no e®ect on ¯rms' incentives to create vacancies. This
follows immediately from (6). As mentioned above, the intuition is that a
high marginal tax rate makes workers less aggressive in bargaining. If the
wage tax exceeds the training subsidy (i.e. ¿ > s¾ so that Ã > 0), the
marginal tax rate reduces the ¯rm's incentive to create vacancies. This is
because the net tax burden on training raises the ¯xed compensation that
employers provide to workers to compensate them for the costs of training. In
other words, ¿ creates an average tax burden comparable to ¿a. Accordingly,
the total surplus available declines so that a rise in ¿ reduces the number of
vacancies and hence labour-market tightness, µ. This is the main di®erence
with a model without training where ¿ does not a®ect µ.
(iv) The tax ¿a a®ects the value of the match and hence the agents' search
activity and ¯rms' incentives to create vacancies. According to (13) the tax
¿a does create social value, but it reduces the private return to ¯rms and
workers. Hence it causes underinvestment in vacancies and search. Since the
training decision is taken after the match, it is only a®ected by the marginal
tax rate ¿ and the training subsidy, s¾, not by ¿a:
(v) If the Hosios condition is not satis¯ed, labor market tightness is too
high compared to the social optimum if the workers' bargaining power ¯ is
too low compared to their productivity in establishing matches ´. Tightness
is too low if ¯ exceeds ´, because ¯rms do not receive a big enough share of
the surplus and hence create too few vacancies.
(vi) Finally, agents always underinvest in search irrespective of whether
their bargaining power is too big or too small. The idea is that too much
13bargaining power for the worker reduces the number of vacancies created and
hence reduces the return to searching. Too little bargaining power reduces a
worker's share of the surplus and hence reduces his search intensity.
The next lemma reveals that, if the Hosios condition is not satis¯ed, taxes
¿;s¾ and ¿a can be used to restore the social optimal outcome, in the case
with zero government expenditure, g = 0.
Lemma 2 If g = 0 and ¯ 6= ´ then there are taxes ¿;¿a and s¾ that restore
the social optimum in the private outcome. Moreover, these taxes balance the
government budget. If training subsidies are not available and ¯ 6= ´ then
the tax instruments ¿ and ¿a are insu±cient to restore the social optimum.
In particular,









(¹ y ¡ c¾) (15)
s¾ = ¿ (16)
make the private outcome in (8), (9) and (12) equivalent to the social out-
come.
The intuition is as follows. The training subsidy s¾ = ¿ ensures that
training decisions are not distorted. The tax instruments ¿ and ¿a can be
used to redistribute the surplus of a match in such a way that ¯rms and
workers get their correct share determined by ´. To illustrate, if the work-
ers' bargaining power ¯ exceeds their productivity ´, the government uses
a positive marginal tax rate ¿ to reduce the workers' bargaining power and
subsidises the ¯rm by setting ¿a < 0. The reason that this can be done with
a balanced budget is that there are no external e®ects in the model. The
total private value created equals the total social value created. The value
just needs to be (re)distributed in the right way.10
If the training subsidy would not be available { e.g. because the govern-
ment cannot observe training e®orts and hence they are not tax deductible {
10Note that the balanced budget result depends on our assumption of constant returns
to scale in the matchingsfunction. In particular, with decreasing returns to scale in the
matchingsfunction the taxes needed to induce the social optimum in the private case yield
a budget surplus for the government. With increasing returns to scale the taxes yield a
de¯cit.
14it would not be possible in general to arrive at the social optimum. Indeed,
the government would have access to just two instruments, ¿, ¿a to correct
three variables, s;¾ and µ. This is not possible in general.
In the next section, we explore the e®ects of a tax reform, starting from
an equilibrium that is not necessarily optimal. Furthermore, we analyze the
case of a positive revenue requirement for the government.
2.3 Tax reform
In this section, public expenditures, g, are positive in the initial equilibrium.
Hence, we start from a sub-optimal equilibrium since the social optimum is
always characterized by zero public revenues (see Lemma 2). We assume that
the level of g remains ¯xed, e.g. because political barriers preclude budgetary
cuts. The government does not have access to a non-distortionary lump-sum
tax to ¯nance its spending. This brings us into a second-best world. Indeed,
the government has to rely on three distortionary tax instruments, ¿;¿a and
s¾, to raise public revenue. This section analyzes the optimal mix between
these taxes. Furthermore, we explore the welfare e®ects of a balanced budget
tax reform from the average tax, ¿a, towards the marginal tax, ¿, if we
start from a sub-optimal initial equilibrium. This reform is interpreted as an
earned income tax credit (EITC).
The government budget constraint is of the form




The government spends g and has to ¯nance this with a wage tax ¿w1 +
¿a (¿w0 + ¿a) per matched and trained (untrained) worker. Further, from
equation (3), the government pays a training subsidy
s¾
1+s¾c¾ per matched
worker. Using equation (3), the government budget constraint can be written
as
g = sm(µ)[¿Ve + ¿a + Ãc¾] (17)
Now consider the folowing two optimization programs.
max
¿;¿a;s¾
sm(µ)[p(¾)y1 + (1 ¡ p(¾))y0 ¡ c¾] ¡ °(s) ¡ ksµ (PC1)





subject to equations (8),(9),(12) and (17)
The following proposition substantially simpli¯es our welfare analysis.
Proposition 3 Optimization programs (PC1) and (PC2) are equivalent.
Hence, instead of maximizing the expression for welfare in (PC1) we just
need to maximize workers' search intensity s subject to the same equations
determining s;¾;µ and government budget balance. The intuition why s is
a su±cient statistic for welfare (13) is as follows. Total surplus is divided
between workers, ¯rms and the government. Since ¯rms make zero expected
pro¯ts by the free entry condition and because we maximize welfare for given
government expenditure g, only workers' surplus creates welfare. As men-
tioned above, substituting (1) into workers' expected surplus yields
sm(µ)Ve ¡ °(s) = s°
0(s) ¡ °(s)
which is positive and increasing in s due to the assumption that °(:) is convex.
Hence s is a su±cient statistic for total welfare.
E®ects on search
To arrive at the reduced form for search, welog-linearize the model around
an initial equilibrium and solve the linearized model analytically. In particu-
lar, we solve the model for two exogenous variables ¿ and s¾. The government
budget constraint is used to adjust ¿a endogenously. Intuitively, the revenues
from a higher marginal tax (or a lower training subsidy) are used to reduce
the average tax per job, such that the government budget remains balanced.
Lemma 4 The reduced form for search can be written as
"s¢~ s = [(¯ ¡ ´)(¹ y ¡c¾) + (1 ¡ ¯)(¿a + Ãc¾)]~ ¿ ¡
Ãc¾
"¾
(~ ¿ ¡ ~ s¾) (18)
where









°0(s) > 0 , "¾ ´ ¡
p00(¾)¾
p0(¾) > 0; ~ s = ds
s ;~ ¿ = d¿
1+¿ and ~ s¾ = ds¾
1+s¾:
16The determinant, ¢; should be strictly positive for the model to be stable.
This means that we should be on the left side of the La®er curve. It requires
that the size of the public sector, g, is not too large. Since, at the optimum,
the marginal change in search is zero, the reduced form shows some direct
implications for the optimal second-best tax structure in case of a positive
revenue requirement for the government, g > 0.
Proposition 5 Consider the case where g > 0:
(i) If ¯ = ´ then it is optimal for the government to set ¿a = 0 and Ã = 0,
irrespective of the level of g;
(ii) if ¯ 6= ´ then it is optimal for the government to set ¿a =
´¡¯
1¡¯(¹ y ¡ c¾)
and Ã = 0, irrespective of the level of g;
(iii) at the optimal taxes it is the case that Ve = ´(¹ y ¡ c¾) ¡
g
sm(µ).
Hence, in a second-best framework with a positive revenue requirement,
the government should always set the average tax per job and the training
subsidy at their ¯rst-best levels derived in equations (15) and (16). Public
revenues should thus be raised by the marginal wage tax alone. The intuition
for this result is the following. As ¯rms earn zero pro¯ts, they cannot bear the
burden of taxation. Indeed, the incidence of all taxes is ultimately borne by
workers in the form of a lower net surplus from search. The government can
tax away this surplus through either ¿ or ¿a(we ignore the training subsidy
for the moment). It turns out that taxing the surplus from search directly
through the wage tax ¿ is more e±cient than taxing it indirectly through
the average tax per job. Intuitively, whereas both taxes distort the search
intensity of the worker, the average tax distorts also labour-market tightness
by reducing vacancies. Accordingly, the average tax per job is a relatively
ine±cient instrument to tax away the surplus from search of the worker.
This result resembles that of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971). Their model
assumes perfect competition, which ensures zero pro¯ts for the ¯rm, and
implies that there is no such distortion as a deviation from the Hosios con-
dition, because each production factor receives its marginal product. If the
government relies on distortionary taxes to raise public revenue, Diamond
and Mirrlees show that it should always maintain production e±ciency, i.e.
the government should not impose taxes that distort the input mix in pro-
duction. In our framework, we ¯nd that the government should not impose
taxes that distort the ratio between vacancies and search, i.e. labour-market
tightness. Hence, only deviations from the Hosios condition call for an aver-
age tax rate, ¿a, not the need to ¯nance g > 0.
17In terms of the optimal incidence, the expression for Ve under (iii) sum-
marizes this discussion. The worker gets his e±cient (Hosios) share ´ of the
surplus (¹ y ¡ c¾) and bears the burden of g per match completely.
Armed with the optimal structure, the reduced form reveals under which
conditions an EITC improves welfare if we start from a sub-optimal equilib-
rium. The following result follows immediately from equation (18).
Proposition 6 Introducing an EITC, here interpreted as a rise in ¿ where
the government budget is balanced by a reduction in ¿a, has the following
implications for welfare:
(i) in case Ã = 0, then it raises welfare if and only if ¿a >
´¡¯
1¡¯(¹ y ¡c¾);
(ii) in case ¿a =
´¡¯
1¡¯(¹ y ¡c¾) and Ã > 0, then it raises welfare if and only if
1 ¡ ¯ >
1
"¾;
(iii) in case ¿a =
´¡¯
1¡¯(¹ y ¡ c¾) and Ã > 0, it always raises welfare if ~ ¿ = ~ s¾.
The intuition for the result is the following.
(i) If training subsidies are set at their ¯rst-best level (i.e. Ã = 0), the
introduction of an EITC would raise welfare if and only if the initial ¿a
exceeds the optimal second-best level in proposition 5 (ii) (see also 15).
(ii) If ¿a is set at its optimal level in (15), a marginal increase in ¿ yields
an ambiguous e®ect on welfare if s¾ is ¯xed at too low a level, that is Ã > 0.
This case with ¿ > s¾ seems relevant in practice. In particular, not all costs
of training are tax deductible. Examples include books, materials, training
hours during leisure time and pure e®ort costs.
With ¿ > s¾; training is taxed on a net basis. This net tax burden
on training causes two distortions. First, it distorts the distribution of the
surplus from a match across the worker and the ¯rm. In particular, the tax
burden on training reduces the surplus for the ¯rm so that a lower level of ¿a
would su±ce to maintain the Hosios condition. Indeed, it is always optimal to
avoid taxing the ¯rm to raise revenu. If one starts from the optimal second-
best level of ¿a (i.e. the level without a training distortion), a marginal
reduction thus yields a ¯rst-order welfare improvement. Second, the net tax
burden on training implies that training is too low. A marginal increase in ¿
exacerbates this distortion if the training subsidy is not adjusted accordingly.
Hence, the overall welfare e®ect of an EITC is ambiguous and depends on the
magnitude of a reform on the two distortions, i.e. the distortion in labour-
market tightness and the distortion in training. The e®ect on the distortion
in labour-market tightness is measured by 1 ¡ ¯, which denotes the extend
18to which the tax burden on training reduces the surplus for the ¯rm. If
¯rms have relatively much bargaining power (i.e. 1 ¡ ¯ is large), they also
bear a large part of the net tax burden on training since these reduce the
surplus from a match. The e®ect on the training distortion depends on ²¾,
which measures the speed with which the rate of return to training declines
with the level of training. In particular, if rate of return to training declines
rapidly with the level of training (i.e. "¾ is large), the e®ect on training will
be small. A net tax burden on training thus makes an EITC more attractive
if the ¯rst e®ect dominates the second e®ect. Otherwise, an EITC becomes
less attractive.
(iii) If the government would raise the training subsidy in line with ¿, or
equivalently all training costs would be tax deductible, it would o®set the ef-
fect of ¿ on the training distortion. Hence, an EITC (i.e. a marginal increase
in ¿ and s¾ and a corresponding reduction in ¿a) would unambiguously raise
welfare since it alleviates the distortion in labour-market tightness.
3 Model without commitment
In the previous model, agents choose training after bargaining parties com-
mitted to the wage pro¯le. In this section, we explore an alternative sequence
of decision making. In particular, we consider the following timing structure.
time
agents ¯rms
0 search intensity si posting vacancies v
1 matches m(v;s)
2 training e®ort ¾
3 bargaining (w0;w1)
4 output (y0;y1)
Hence, households decide about their training e®ort before negotiating
about the wage pro¯le.
3.1 The private outcome
If ¯rms cannot commit to a wage pro¯le (w0;w1), the worker and ¯rm
(re)negotiate the wage in each state, trained and untrained. Again assuming
19zero threat points, wi is determined by the Nash bargaining function in state











(yi ¡ ¿a) (19)
i = 0;1.
Hence, if bargaining parties negotiate the wage outcome after the training
decision, the wage pro¯le di®ers from the model with commitment above.
Indeed, comparing the wages in (10) and (11) reveals that the wage pro¯le
is less steep in the model without commitment, because in the commitment
case w0 is below
¯
1+¿(y0 ¡ ¿a) and w1 above
¯
1+¿(y1 ¡ ¿a). The intuition is
the following. Although the division of the surplus may not be optimal in
the commitment case above (if Hosios is not satis¯ed), the ¯rm has still an
incentive to set the wage di®erence w1¡w0 in such a way as to maximize the
total surplus. In the no commitment case here, the training costs are already
sunk when the ¯rm and worker bargain about the surplus. Hence the relevant
surplus for the ¯rm is yi ¡ ¿a, not the total surplus ¹ y ¡ ¿a ¡ (1 + Ã)c¾. In
other words, the ¯rm has neither the means nor the incentive to maximize
the total surplus.
Note that the commitment case assumes commitment from both the ¯rm
and the worker not to renegotiate wages. In particular, in the untrained
state the worker has an incentive to renegotiate because the wage w0 in (10)
is below the renegotiation wage
¯
1+¿(y0 ¡ ¿a). Similarly, in the trained state
the ¯rm has an incentive to renegotiate because w1 in (11) is above the rene-
gotiation wage
¯
1+¿(y1 ¡ ¿a). In other words, the commitment case requires
an institutional setting where both parties have an incentive to stick to their
agreement. Reasons may be that individual workers and ¯rms try to build
a reputation for being able to commit. This is most likely if relationships
are expected to last long. Alternatively, unions and representatives of ¯rms
bargain at a centralized level and force their constituencies to stick to the
agreement because the aggregate surplus is bigger with commitment. Either
way, in our interpretation, the commitment case is more likely to come about
on the European continent than in the Anglosaxon countries (Teulings and
Hartog, 1998). We return to this below.
20It follows that



















Comparing this expression to (9), for given Ã, workers invest less in training
in the no commitment case than in the commitment case. The intuition is
that in the no commitment case, workers pay all training costs while they
share the returns of training with ¯rms. Further,
Je = p(¾)(y1 ¡ (1 + ¿)w1) + (1 ¡ p(¾))(y0 ¡ (1 + ¿)w0) ¡ ¿a




where the last equality follows from the government budget constraint (17).
The interpretation is that the total surplus after a match, ¹ y¡c¾, is distributed
over employers, Je, employees, Ve, and the government,
g
sm(µ). Combining this
equation with the free entry condition (2) yields
kµ
m(µ)




The ¯rst order condition (1) for search intensity s remains unchanged
°
0(s) = m(µ)Ve (24)
3.2 The social optimum
To ¯nd the solution for the optimal taxes, we again simplify the analysis by




sm(µ)[p(¾)y1 + (1 ¡ p(¾))y0 ¡ c¾] ¡ °(s) ¡ ksµ (PNC1)





subject to (21), (23), (24), (19) and (20)
Proposition 7 The optimization programs (PNC1) and (PNC2) are equiva-
lent.
The intuition for this equivalence is the same as in proposition 3. In fact,
the proof of proposition 3 does not depend on the commitment assumption.
Proposition 8 With optimal taxes, the commitment and no commitment
cases yield the same values for s;µ;¾ and Ve. Comparing the optimal taxes












NC = ¡(1 ¡ ¯)
Ã
C = 0
where the solution to (PC1) is denoted by (¿C;¿C
a ;sC




the solution to (PNC1) is denoted by (¿NC;¿NC
a ;sNC




The three tax instruments ¿;¿a and s¾ can solve the problem of lack of
commitment, in the sense that the values for s;µ;¾ and Ve are the same
with optimal taxes in the commitment and no commitment case. In both
cases we ¯nd that training e®ort ¾ maximizes the total surplus of a match
p(¾)y1+(1¡p(¾))y0¡c¾. In the commitment case we see this by substituting
the optimal value Ã
C = 0 in proposition 5 into equation (9). In the no
commitment case the result follows from substituting Ã
NC = ¡(1 ¡ ¯) into
equation (21). The reason why the government revenue requirement does
not a®ect the value of the surplus ¹ y ¡ c¾ is again production e±ciency. If
¯nancing g would distort ¾, it indirectly reduces tightness (and search s)
by reducing the value of the match. As argued above, the demand side of
the labour market cannot bear the burden of taxation because of the free
entry condition. Since the burden of taxation falls on the labour supply side
22anyway, it is more e±cient to tax s directly and leave ¾ and µ at the their
e±cient level rather than distorting ¾ and thereby µ and s as well.
Given this optimal value of ¹ y¡c¾, the question is how this surplus net of
government expenditure, ¹ y ¡c¾ ¡
g
sm(µ), is distributed over workers, Ve, and
¯rms, Je. This distribution then a®ects s and µ. The instruments ¿ and ¿a
are used to achieve this distribution. (PC2) and (PNC2) make clear that Ve is
chosen to maximize search s or equivalently welfare (13). The way to do this
is to give workers their Hosios share ´ of surplus ¹ y¡c¾ minus the government
expenditure requirement per match
g
sm(µ). Thus Ve = ´(¹ y ¡ c¾) ¡
g
sm(µ).
The reason why workers bear the incidence of g completely is (again) that
¯rms earn zero (expected) pro¯ts and hence cannot bear any incidence at
all. The value of Ve in the no commitment case corresponds to the value in
proposition 5 (iii) for the commitment case. Hence Ve;s and µ are the same
in the commitment and no commitment case. However, the values of the tax
instruments di®er in the two cases.
The intuition for the tax results is the following. The model without
commitment contains two additional distortions compared to the commit-
ment case. First, training is too low in the no-commitment case due to the
hold-up problem. Indeed, the social bene¯ts of training exceed the private
bene¯ts for the worker so that the private outcome yields too little incentives
for training. In the commitment case, training is distorted only if it is taxed
on a net basis. Proposition 8 reveals that the hold-up problem can be alle-
viated in the no commitment case by setting the training subsidy above the
marginal wage tax, that is training is subsidized on a net basis (Ã < 0). In
particular, the net subsidy on training should raise the return to training for
the worker so that the marginal costs and bene¯ts coincide. This calls for a
net subsidy equal to 1¡¯, i.e. the share of the bene¯ts of training that °ow
to the ¯rm instead of the worker. The second distortion due to the lack of
commitment in wage bargaining appears because training costs do not reduce
the surplus from a match to the ¯rm. Accordingly, it distorts labour-market
tightness. Compared to the commitment case, this calls for a higher average
tax and a lower marginal tax in order to redistribute surplus from the ¯rm to
the worker. Intuitively, redistributing the surplus creates the right incentives
for search and vacancy creation by equating the marginal private bene¯ts
with the corresponding marginal productivities in the matching process.
If we start from an arbitrary tax system, the introduction of an EITC
is thus more likely to improve welfare in an economy characterized by com-
23mitment on the labour market than in an economy without commitment.
Interpreting the US economy as being characterized by less commitment
than the economies on the European continent, we conclude that an EITC
in Europe would be more attractive than in the US. In the US, a number of
economists already consider the EITC as a successful instrument to stimulate
participation. Indeed, Eissa and Liebmann (1995) ¯nd that the EITC sig-
ni¯cantly raises the participation of women with children. Furthermore, the
adverse incentive e®ects of high marginal taxes on hours worked are found
to be negligible.
4 Concluding remarks
This paper formalizes the trade-o® between labour-market participation and
training in a model of search on the labour market. In particular, it illus-
trates the optimal tax structure in the presence of three distortions, namely
a training distortion, a public revenue requirement that has to be ¯nanced
by distortionary taxes, and a hold-up problem that arises because ¯rms and
workers cannot pre-commit to the return to search and vacancies. We are able
to derive analytical results because we use a simpli¯ed, static representation
of the search model in the tradition of Pissarides (1990) and Morensen and
Pissarides (1999). Although our approach captures some important features
of these dynamic models, it may also have some limitations. In particular,
since we ignore dynamics, our results should be interpreted as steady-state
solutions. Especially for human capital formation, this may be too simplis-
tic, although we believe that our model captures the main incentive e®ects
of training. An important assumption in our model is that tax policies have
no implications for the fall back position of workers and ¯rms, which always
have a value equal to zero. If these values were positive, which is the case
in a dynamic model of search, taxes may have a di®erent impact on labour-
market decisions, including the training decision. This type analysis may be
left for future research, but it seems unlikely that one would be able to derive
analytical solutions from such a model.
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Appendix
This appendix contains the proofs of the results in this paper.
Proof of Lemma 1
The ¯rst order conditions for s;µ and ¾ in maximizing welfare (13) are
respectively
m(µ)(¹ y ¡ c¾) ¡ °
0(s) ¡ kµ = 0 (25)
m
0(µ)[¹ y ¡ c¾] ¡ k = 0 (26)
p
0(¾)(y1 ¡ y0) ¡ c = 0 (27)
where, as above, ¹ y = p(¾)y1 + (1 ¡ p(¾))y0. Rewriting equation (26) as










(i) Comparing (27), (28) and (29) to the private outcome in equations
(8), (9) and (12) shows that the private and social outcomes coincide if
¿ = s¾ = ¿a = 0 and ¯ = ´.
(ii) Comparing (29) with (8) shows that for given µ, ¿ > 0 implies that
the private s is lower than the socially optimal s. Further, (12) together with
Ã ¸ 0;¿a ¸ 0 implies that private µ does not exceed socially optimal µ. This
implies that s in (8) does not exceed s in (29).
26(iii) The e®ect on training follows immediately from (9) and (27). Since
the value of ¾ in (27) maximizes ¹ y ¡ c¾, it follows from (28) and (12) (with
the assumption that ¿a ¸ 0) that private µ is below socially optimal µ.
(iv) ¿ = s¾ = 0 implies that Ã = 0 and hence both private and socially
optimal ¾ maximize ¹ y ¡ c¾. Now comparing equations (28) and (12) shows
that ¿a < 0 implies that µ is higher in private outcome than in social opti-
mum. Comparing (29) and (8) shows that the higher private µ implies that
private search s is higher than socially optimal search.
(v) The e®ects of ¯ 6= ´ are as follows. First, note that ¾ is una®ected























> 0 if ¯ < ´
< 0 if ¯ > ´
Hence s is always too low if ¯ 6= ´. QED
Proof of Lemma 2
It is routine to verify that ¿;s¾ and ¿a satisfying








(¹ y ¡ c¾)
s¾ = ¿
make the private outcome in (8), (12) and (9) equivalent to the social outcome
in (29), (28) and (27). To check budget balance we show that ¿(p(¾)w1 +
(1 ¡ p(¾))w0) + ¿a ¡ s¾
1+s¾c¾ = 0 as follows
¿(p(¾)w1 + (1 ¡p(¾))w0) + ¿a ¡
s¾c¾
1 + s¾




¯(¹ y ¡ c¾ ¡¿a) + ¿a
= (¹ y ¡ c¾)
½









27where the ¯rst equality follows from (3), the second equality from Ã = 0
and (5) and the third equality follows from the expressions for ¿ and ¿a
above. QED
Proof of proposition 3
Using the expressions for the value of a match for the worker and the ¯rm
(5) and (6), we write
(1 + ¿)Ve + Je = [¹ y ¡ ¿a ¡ (1 + Ã)c¾]
Using this expression to eliminate ¹ y ¡ c¾ from (13), we write welfare as
sm(µ)[¿Ve + ¿a + Ãc¾] + s[m(µ)Ve ¡
°(s)
s




Using (1) and (2) and the government budget constraint (17), we can






Hence, welfare is determined by public expenditures, the net surplus from
search and the net surplus from vacancies (which equals zero). Since we




Because °00(s) > 0 for each s ¸ 0, welfare maximization is equivalent to
maximization of search. Note that this holds true for both the case with and
without commitment (see below). QED
Proof of lemma 4
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°0(s) ;"¾ ´ ¡
p00(¾)¾
p0(¾) ; ~ ¿ ´ d¿
1+¿ and ~ s¾ ´ ds¾
1+s¾.
28Using equation (7), government budget constraint (17) can be written as
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¶
~ ¿ + sm(µ)¿a~ ¿a ¡ sm(µ)c¾(1 + Ã)~ s¾
Using dg = 0 we get
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(31)
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Using the ¯rst row of (30), we ¯nd the following reduced form for search
"s¢~ s = ([¯ ¡ ´](¹ y ¡ c¾) + (1 ¡ ¯)(¿a + Ãc¾)) ~ ¿ ¡
Ãc¾
"¾
(~ ¿ ¡ ~ s¾)
QED
Proof of proposition 5
29Proposition 3 says that maximizing welfare subject to (8),(9),(12) and
(17) is equivalent to maximizing search subject to these four equations. The
reduced form in (18) takes these four equations already into account. To ¯nd
the socially optimal taxes, we need (only) to solve
ds
d¿ = 0 and
ds
ds¾ = 0. From
(18), it follows immediately that
ds
ds¾ = 0 if and only if
Ãc¾
"¾ = 0, that is Ã = 0,
or equivalently ¿ = s¾. Using this in the ¯rst order condition ds
d¿ = 0 yields






Note that these expressions for Ã and ¿a are independent of the level of g.
In other words, only ¿ is a®ected by the level of g.
(i) and (ii) follow immediately from Ã = 0 and ¿a =
´¡¯
1¡¯(¹ y ¡ c¾).
(iii) Noting that the total surplus ¹ y ¡ c¾ is divided among employed
workers, ¯rms and the government, we can write
Ve + Je +
g
sm(µ)
= ¹ y ¡ c¾
or equivalently
Ve = ¹ y ¡ c¾ ¡ Je ¡
g
sm(µ)
= ¹ y ¡ c¾ ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)
µ
¹ y ¡c¾ ¡
´ ¡ ¯
1 ¡ ¯





= ´(¹ y ¡ c¾) ¡
g
sm(µ)
where the second equality follows from equation (6) and the expressions for
optimal taxes Ã = 0 and ¿a =
´¡¯
1¡¯(¹ y ¡ c¾). QED
Proof of proposition 6
The reduced form (18) is derived under the assumption that changes in
¿ (and s¾) are o®set by changes in ¿a to keep a balanced budget for the gov-
ernment. In particular, this follows from the dg = 0 assumption in equation
(31) above. The results (i), (ii) and (iii) follow immediately from equation
30(18). QED
Proof of proposition 7
It is straightforward to verify that the proof of proposition 3 also applies




subject to (21),(23),(24),(19) and (20)
QED
Proof of proposition 8
Instead of maximizing with respect to ¿;¿a and s¾, we determine ¯rst the
wage level w0 and the wage di®erential ¢ ´ w1¡w0 which maximize s. From
these we derive the corresponding optimal values of the tax instruments ¿;¿a
and s¾.





0(s) = m(µ)(w0 + p(¾)¢ ¡ c¾)
kµ
m(µ)







where the three equations determining s;µ and ¾ follow from (20), (21), (23)
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where ¹ g ´
g
sm(µ). De¯ning det as the determinant of the matrix at the left
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Using °0(s) = m(µ)Ve in
ds








Ve = ´(¹ y ¡ c¾) ¡ ¹ g
Further,
ds


















0 (¾)(y1 ¡ y0
= 0





y1¡y0: That is, ¾ is at its socially optimal level. Further,
the expression for the incidence Ve = ´(¹ y ¡ c¾) ¡ ¹ g is the same as in the
commitment case (see proposition 5 (iii)).
Now we turn to the problem of determining the values of the tax instru-
ments in the commitment and no commitment case. Proposition 5 implies
that Ã
C = 0. Hence it follows from (9) that the private ¾C in the commit-
ment case satis¯es p0(¾) =
c
y1¡y0. Thus we ¯nd ¾NC = ¾C. Let ¾ denote
this value ¾ ´ ¾NC = ¾C. Whereas Ã
C = 0 achieves this value of ¾ in the
commitment case, equation (21) implies that Ã
NC = ¡(1 ¡¯).























32where ¹ yC = ¹ yNC = ¹ y ´ p(¾)y1 + (1 ¡p(¾))y0.























Comparing the equations for sC;µ
C and V C
e with these for sNC;µ
NC and V NC
e
shows immediately that sC = sNC = s, µ
C = µ
NC = µ and V C
e = V NC
e = Ve.
However, the values of the tax instruments ¿;¿a;Ã to achieve these values
di®er in the commitment and no commitment case.
From thegovernment budget constraint (17) and theexpression for Ã
NC =






a ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)c¾
Using Ve = ´(¹ y ¡ c¾) ¡
g






NC´(¹ y ¡ c¾) + ¿
NC
a ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)c¾











where the expression for ¿C
a follows from proposition 5 (ii).
Finally, the expression for ¿NC is derived from the government budget














(¹ y ¡ c¾)
Substracting these two equations yields
0 = (¿
NC ¡ ¿
C)Ve + ¯c¾
33or equivalently
¿
C = ¿
NC +
¯c¾
Ve
QED
34